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BOOK REVIEW
THE SUPREME COURT AND "POLITICAL QuEsTioNs": A STUDY IN JUDI-
CIAL EvAsION. By Philippa Strum.' The University of Alabama Press,
Birmingham, Alabama. Pp. 188. $7.50.
Professor Strum has contributed another volume to the ever-expand-
ing library of literature on the operation of the power of judicial review
in the United States Supreme Court. THE SUPREME COURT AND
"POLITICAL QUESTIONS": A STUDY IN JUDICIAL EVASION,'
consists, as one might expect, of an effort to analyze those cases in
which the Court has (and those relevant instances in which it has not)
declined to exercise jurisdiction that might otherwise belong within its
particular sphere of competence, on the ground that the issue is more
appropriately left for final decision by the "political branches" of
government. In his analysis, Professor Strum leads us through an
extensive review of the cases, having subdivided them for the sake of
manageability into four classes based upon the subject matter in litiga-
tion before the Court. The first, not surprisingly, is composed of the
small number of cases in which the issue presented to the Court
revolved about article IV, section 4 of the Constitution of the United
States, which guarantees a "Republican Form of Government" to every
state in the Union.3 These cases come immediately to mind, of course,
because the Court conceived the doctrine of "political questions" in this
context; or perhaps we should say simply that the doctrine was identi-
fied when the first conflict involving this provision of the Constitution
came before the Court.4 Although these cases captured center stage
for many decades and still retain significant historical interest, the spot-
1. Associate Professor of Political Science, Brooklyn College.
2. P. STRUM, THE SUPREME COURT AND PoLmiCAL QuEsTIoNs: A STUDY IN JU-
DIciAL EVASION (1974) [hereinafter cited as STRUM].
3. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a Republican
form of Government ... ." U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 4.
4. The case of first impression was Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19
(1827), in which Justice Story first articulated the doctrine of political questions. The
most famous of these cases, Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), was decided
in the embattled context of the Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island.
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light has shifted to another subject-apportionment. This, the second
and by far the most extensive group of cases, together with the related
discussion of a third group of cases involving other electoral process
issues, form the focal point of the book and the theory which it pro-
poses. Finally, there is a discussion of those "political question" cases
touching upon the executive power.
Professor Strum's starting point is the admonition of John P. Roche:
A juridical definition of the term [political question] is impossible, for
at root the logic that supports it is circular: political questions are
matters not soluble by the judicial process; matters not soluble by the
judicial process are political questions.0
The mistake, according to Strum, has been the "attempt to define the
category as a function of political institutions-that is, as political
dogma or a constitutional doctrine such as separation of powers-rather
than of the political process-that is, the struggle to obtain and retain
power."7 Lest the reader gasp in horror at the images of the Justices
of the United States Supreme Court grappling for political power, Pro-
fessor Strum assuages our incipient revulsion by a footnote in which
he assures us that, "power is [not] sought as an end in itself ...
In the case of the political question, the Justices concern themselves
with the power problem in order to retain their freedom to implement
their versions of the 'good life.' "8
Professor Strum is quick to recognize, however, that "politicization"
of the federal judiciary would be unacceptable to the public mind.
"Popular belief in an independent judiciary enables the courts to place
a final stamp of legitimacy upon all governmental acts, including those
which might otherwise come under direct attack in the form of disobe-
dience."' The importance of public confidence in the courts and in the
integrity of their judges is not, in Professor Strum's opinion, to be
minimized:
5. There has been significant opinion that the shift of emphasis from the republi-
can guarantee clause to apportionment required under the equal protection clause has
been, itself, an evasion technique by which the Court has been able to ignore its earlier
precedents, while not overruling itself. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266
(1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
6. Roche, Judicial Self Restraint, 49 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 762, 768 (1955).
7. STRUM 1.
8. Id. at 146 n.6. Some strict constructionists might not be very comforted by
this explanation.
9. Id. at 3.
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This unenlightened esteem is indispensable to the courts, for it
constitutes their only independent resource. The Court can hand down
opinion after opinion-scholarly, thoughtful, realistic-but unless it
parallels public feeling, or unless the "political" branches and particu-
larly the executive are willing to undertake its enforcement, a Court
decree becomes a meaningless piece of paper.' 0
The constitutional system would be undermined because "[d]isrespect
for the Court means that it fails in its job of legitimation."" In this,
of course, he agrees with constitutional scholars of nearly every persua-
sion.1" While acknowledging the importance, under our constitutional
system, of public respect for the Court, Professor Strum nevertheless
labels the conception of an independent judiciary committed to the
principled adjudication of actual controversies within its assigned juris-
diction as one of the popular myths upon which society is necessarily
based." The Court may realize the significance of developing public
belief in judicial neutrality, and articulate those principles which will
best assure the image of a detached, reflective judiciary. To the extent
the Court develops and acts according to those principles, does it not
in fact respect the principle of neutrality or the "Rule of Law"? Perhaps
the problem is a metaphysical one, but the allegation that the "actual
motivation" of the Court is neither the one projected to the legal pro-
fession through the articulation of "principled decisions," nor the one
popularly held by laymen, seems to require more elaborate explanation
of its premises and criteria for distinguishing the reality from the myth.
The important effort by scholars to demythologize the operation of pub-
lic institutions has contributed much to our understanding and apprecia-
tion of those institutions. Even the most well intentioned of these in-
vestigations, however, can be misled by its own enthusiasm. 14
10. Id.
11. Id. at 4.
12. Justice Brandeis, for example, dissenting in Horning v. District of Columbia,
254 U.S. 135, 139 (1920), stated, "[The judge] may advise; he may persuade; but he
may not command or coerce. He does coerce when without convincing the judgment
he overcomes the will by the weight of authority." Although the issue in that case was
the usurpation of jury prerogative by the court, a parallel can certainly be drawn to the
issue of usurpation of legislative (or executive) power.
13. SmTuM 3. In his summary and conclusions Professor Strum asserts that "the
civilization able to function without a mythology had not yet evolved; this is a neces-
sary part of ours." Id. at 143.
14. Cf. R. FOGEL & S. ENFERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS (1974). A flood of con-
troversy has been engendered.
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The Supreme Court has been many things to many people. Great
institutions of enduring value exist in a complex world with com-
peting and often conflicting ideologies, and to survive must steer
a careful course, as the Court has done. The subtleties necessi-
tated by such navigation ought not to be subjected to the reductionist
impulse without appropriate recognition that distortion inevitably
accompanies the attempt to schematize reality. Implicit, however, in
Professor Strums general discussion of judicial review is the recognition
of this problem. He appears both convinced of the artificiality of the
Court's rhetoric and impressed with its success in fostering public
respect for the Court and the system at whose pinnacle it stands.Yr The
late Professor Bickel cautioned that
[n]o one should underestimate the dominion of ideas in a nation
committed to the rule of principle as well as to majoritarian democracy.
Acknowledging the limits of the rule of principle and its fragility when
it passes them must not plunge one into such an underestimate.10
This warning bears repetition.
The specific thesis of this book is the factors which define the opera-
tion of the political question doctrine as a "non-principle" of constitu-
tional law decisionmaking. According to Professor Strum, the political
question doctrine is the product of a determination, consciously or un-
consciously made by the Court, of the difficulty of enforcing any deci-
sion which the Court is likely to make based on existing constitutional
principles. The author believes that this occurs when the Court
is presented with avant-garde litigation prior to the time at which
the changing societal values have coalesced sufficiently to support a
new constitutional doctrine. The Court then, is faced with the
Hobson's choice of either making a decision that is certain to go
unenforced (based upon emerging social norms) or making one that
is "likely.to be enforced but at the same time depending on a negation
of an existing or emerging American 'truth'" (this alternative based
upon principles existing in the twilight of acceptability).17 In either
case, the argument continues, "the Court would suffer a loss of pres-
tige and power."' "Some crotchety people," says Professor Strum,
15. 'This unenlightened esteem is indispensable to the courts .... " ST Um 3
(emphasis added).
16. A. BIcKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANcH 188 (1962).
17. STRuM 4.
18. Id.
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"may call this ducking the situation, but many other observers will point
to it as yet another indication of the Court's uncorrupted wisdom. In
reality, this is no more than another example of that human instinct for
self-preservation which, at the institutional level, becomes a partiality
towards power." 19
The author rejects the late Professor Bickel's suggestion that
the political question doctrine is frequently used as an educative
device. This, according to Strum, is simply not supportable.20  Simi-
larly, it should be noted, Professor Bickel rejected Professor Strum's
thesis (albeit long before the publication of this book). In his ex-
ploration of the "Passive Virtues," Bickel, discussing Colegrove v.
Green,2 stated:
The decisive factor in Colegrove could not well have been the difficulty
or uncertainty that might attend enforcement of a judicial decree. It
comes easily enough to mind that the foreseeable difficulty in the School
Desegregation Cases was graver, and that the difficulties in many earlier
and later Fifteenth Amendment cases were not appreciably less
serious.22
In all fairness to Professor Strum, however, there is probably signifi-
cantly less divergence between the two than the quoted passage would
seem to indicate. Professor Bickel summarized his sense of the political
question doctrine when he wrote that its foundation is
in both intellect and instinct. . . the Court's sense of lack of capacity,
compounded in unequal parts of (a) the strangeness of the issue and
its intractability to principled resolution; (b) the sheer momentousness
of it, which tends to unbalance judicial judgment; (c) the anxiety, not
so much that the judicial judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it
should but will not be; (d) finally ("in a mature democracy"), the inner
vulnerability, the seif-doubt of an institution which is electorally irre-
sponsible and has no earth to draw strength from.
23
Professor Bickel's point (c) seems to coincide directly with Professor
Strum's contention that the Court, facing two equally undesirable alter-
natives, uses the political question doctrine to choose neither. Strum
points out that one alternative is a decision based upon a discredited
(or rapidly waning) ideology. Professor Bickel suggested that the
19. Id. at 5-6.
20. Id. at 6-8.
21. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
22. A. BICKEL, supra note 16, at 191.
23. Id. at 184.
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Court was, in these cases, concerned that perhaps any decision based
on existing principles would be enforced, but that such enforcement
was undesirable.
Clearly, an appreciation of the Court's fear that a decision will
diminish its prestige shapes the entire development of Professor
Bickel's thesis of the "Passive Virtues," including his explanation of the
particular nature of the political question doctrine. According to Pro-
fessor Strum's argument, the ultimate basis for the decision not to adju-
dicate is the long term lack of vitality generated by lost prestige.
Missing from Strum, but present in Bickel and others, who wanted
to reevaluate the work of the Court by analyzing its actual opera-
tion and not its "normative rhetoric," is a greater recognition of
the subtleties of the process of constitutional law decisionmaking; also
lacking is a frank acknowledgment that the explanation will not be
found in a single impulse, however fundamentally a part of the prevail-
ing conception of human nature that impulse may be. For instance,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, consistently an exponent of judicial restraint,
dissented in Baker v. Carr24 and urged the Court to decline "jurisdic-
tion" on the ground that the question before the Court was not appro-
priate for judicial resolution. He stated:
Disregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the Court's
"judicial power" not only presages the futility of judicial intervention in
the essentially political conflict of forces by which the relation between
population and representation has time out of mind been and now is
determined. It may well impair the Court's position as the ultimate
organ of "the supreme Law of the Land" in that vast range of legal prob-
lems, often strongly entangled in popular feeling, on which this Court
must pronounce. The Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse
nor the sword-ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its
moral sanction..
We were soothingly told at the bar of this Court that we need not
worry about the kind of remedy a court could effectively fashion . . .
because legislatures would heed the Court's admonition. . . .. [This]
implies a sorry confession of judicial impotence in place of a frank
acknowledgment that there is not under our Constitution a judicial
remedy for every political mischief, for every undesirable exercise of
legislative power. . . . In any event there is nothing judicially more
24. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/10
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unseemly nor more self-defeating than for this Court to make in
terrorem pronouncements, to indulge in merely empty rhetoric, sounding
a word of promise to the ear, sure to be disappointing to the hope.25
To suggest that such an exposition of judicial logic can be reduced to
the bare bones of "power guardianship" when stripped of its ideologi-
cal flesh requires a too patently psychoanalytical perspective. A more
eclectic approach would lend substantial weight to what seems to be an
accurate, but uncomfortably narrow perspective.
Putting to one side a disagreement with the singularity of Professor
Strum's thesis, there is much merit in the contention that the problem
of ultimate enforcement of any judicial decree weighs heavily on the
minds of Justices who must decide whether to adjudicate a particular
controversy urged upon them. Admittedly, the Court itself has gener-
ated much of the recent literature that seeks to "go behind the rhetoric"
of its decisions. In many cases it has been either less than candid in
articulating the constitutional premises of its decisions, or it has been
sufficiently incoherent or incomplete to generate legitimate curiosity.
Baker v. Carr2" is a case in point. The Court did not find that a
political question barred adjudication on the merits of a controversy
involving the Tennessee legislature's failure to reapportion its districts
in spite of dramatic shifts in population during the sixty years since its
last apportionment. Early in his opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan
asserted that "[t]he nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily
a function of the separation of powers. 12 7 Later he cavalierly observed
that "[t]he question here is the consistency of state action with the Fed-
eral Constitution. We have no question decided, or to be decided, by
a political branch of government coequal with this Court. ' 28 The failure
even to allude to the repeated seating of elected representatives from
Tennessee by the Congress of the United States, a coequal branch of
government, invites disbelief. The Congress possessed both the power
to "judge the qualifications of its own members"29 and the obligation,
according to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court, to "guarantee
a Republican Form of Government""0 to every state in the Union.
25. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267, 269-70 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
ing).
26. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
27. Id. at 210.
28. Id. at 226.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
30. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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Such a deliberate and unexplained failure to deal squarely with one of
the most difficult aspects of earlier precedents necessarily breeds
skepticism. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, stated clearly that the
Court was not merely overlooking some minor facet of its previous
decisions, but that it had been admonished to consider the difficult
problems implicit in distinguishing Baker from previous cases held to
be political under the Republican Guarantee Clause.3 1
Justice Clark came closest to acknowledging the political nature
of the problem and his reasons for believing Baker to be outside exist-
ing precedent. In language strongly reminiscent of Justice Stone's fa-
mous footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,8 2 Justice
Clark stated:
Although I find the Tennessee apportionment statute offends the Equal
Protection Clause, I would not consider intervention by this Court into
so delicate a field if there were any other relief available to the people
of Tennessee. But the majority of the people of Tennessee have no
"practical opportunities for exerting their political weight at the polls"
31. Having been apparently unsuccessful at convincing his brethren in conference,
Justice Frankfurter began his dissent by stating what appeared to be obvious. "The Court
today reverses a uniform course of decision established by a dozen cases, including one
by which the very claim now sustained was unanimously rejected only five years ago."
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962). Later he concluded that the appellants' con-
tention that the equal protection clause guarantees equal weight to every vote and a basis
of representation tied exclusively to population simply cannot be independently sus-
tained.
To find such a political conception legally enforceable in the broad and unspe-
cific guarantee of equal protection is to rewrite the Constitution. . . . Indeed
since "equal protection of the laws" can only mean an equality of persons
standing in the same relation to whatever governmental action is challenged,
the determination whether treatment is equal presupposes a determination con-
cerning the nature of the relationship. This, with respect to apportionment,
means an inquiry into the theoretic base of representation in an acceptably re-
publican state.... To divorce "equal protection" from "Republican Form"
is to talk about half a question.
Id. at 300-01.
32. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Justice Stone stated:
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitu-
tionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition
of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments . ...
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most
other types of legislation.
Id. at 152, n.4.
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to correct the existing "invidious discrimination." Tennessee has no
initiative and referendum. I have searched diligently for other "practi-
cal opportunities" present under law. I find none other than through
the federal courts.33
Professor Strum concludes, "The Court's realization that a societal
majority and its Presidential representative would be sufficient insur-
ance against enforcement difficulties caused the reapportionment issue
to be dusted off and removed from the political question shelf. ' 34 He
fails to explain, however, why the Court became so confident in its abil-
ity to fashion apportionment formulas and to enforce them against en-
trenched political machines. In fact, we now know that enforcement
was slow, difficult, and not without significant opposition to judicial
interference in this most partisan of political activities.
A strong bias shapes this work from beginning to end. It is the
belief that the courts are legitimate organs of government for policy
making. Professor Strum comments, "Like Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, Baker v. Carr was 'bad law' in that it prepared the way for a flood
of litigation that could have been halted by the establishment of an
absolute standard.""3 Later he observes that the Court "involved itself
in the politics of the people and emerged unscathed, still clothed in the
garb of constitutionalism. This is surely no more and no less than the
legitimate function of the Court[!]."" Obviously, Professor Strum
does not share a belief in a government of law, not of men, under a
written constitution embodying restraints upon government and dele-
gating specialized tasks to separate units within a single system, in an
attempt to achieve a meaningful check on the abuse of power. In his
concluding remarks he asserts that, "There is nothing in the idea of
separation of powers which prevents the Court from making any deci-
sion it wants to, but there is something in the theory which gives the
Justices an excuse for not deciding an issue they do not wish to
touch. '3 7  We apparently are being told that despite 200 years of
relatively successful constitutional government, the only "real" re-
straints, in the last analysis, are those of power politics-that the Court
can only operate within the parameters of societal consensus. "When
it declares the presence of a political question, the Court tacitly admits
33. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 258-59 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring).
34. STRUm 66.
35. Id. at 83.
36. Id. at 91 (punctuation added).
37. Id. at 143.
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that it cannot find, and therefore cannot ratify, a social consensus which
does not violate basic American beliefs. . . If the Court admitted
such considerations openly, however, it would destroy its image as a
neutral, objective, eternal body."3
Admittedly, many of the Court's opinions in political question
disputes either explicitly articulate concern with the powerlessness of
the judiciary to enforce unpopular decisions or are informed with a
sense of self-doubt in this connection. It is, however, very difficult to
separate the self-interest that generates this concern from the philo-
sophically different issue of concern for the lack of political responsibil-
ity of an appointive judicial body which serves during "good behavior"
regardless of the climate of public opinion respecting its decisions. In
the second issue, the root of the dilemma is the fundamental principle
that in a democratic society policy decisions should remain in the hands
of elected representatives. In the first case, the Court's self interest
in retaining its power provides a more practical basis. Finally, the
Court may have genuine concern for its institutional role in a constitu-
tional system, and fear that its inability to enforce even a principled
decision will sap the vitality of the entire constitutional scheme. Quite
happily for the Court, the self-interest of the Court in maintaining its
power to influence the future course of events in the country coincides
significantly with the public interest in securing the continuing viability
of the constitutional system. This may be one of the factors that has
allowed the Court to maintain its consistently high level of prestige,
in spite of much "scholarly" criticism.
Anthony Lewis noted in a recent article" that in spite of general
disillusionment with governmental institutions among Americans, ram-
pant skepticism about the integrity of persons in power has not, despite
academic criticism, significantly altered the respect Americans feel for
the institution of the Supreme Court and the men to whom the process
of constitutional adjudication is entrusted. Commenting upon the
reaction of a recent group of American law students who visited the
Supreme Court, Lewis observed that "there was something surprising,
and possibly significant, in [their] reaction. . . . [The students were
enormously impressed . . .by the process." One student remarked,
"There was a sense that [the Justices] were interested in the merits
38. Id. at 142, 143.
39. Lewis, A Day in Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1975, at 39.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/10
Vol. 1975:1141]
of the issues, not in power." Another opined, "[Slomething happens
to people who become Supreme Court Justices. They may be
ordinary, but they understand the responsibility and try to carry it."
Lewis believes that the students' remarks summarize the abiding
attitude of most Americans. The tenacity of the public esteem for the
Court and its Justices is, according to Lewis, the result of the Court's
chosen function: providing the lubrication necessary for a rapidly
changing society to survive under a written constitution.
The problem of any free society, over the long haul, is how to adapt
to enormous changes in the objective circumstances of life-technology,
population, social upheaval-while remaining constant to the basic prin-
ciples of freedom. In the United States, that has been the special and
extraordinary function of the courts. Judges have kept the American
Constitution alive. . . . There have always been skeptics to warn
against reliance on judicial power .... Other critics say that courts
have not done enough for liberty .... But there is something in the
feeling of a visitor that the Supreme Court of the United States is en-
titled, as an institution, to our faith. 40
Perhaps we lawyers are more easily persuaded by ideological
rhetoric than by the cold-blooded analysis of political scientists. Or
perhaps, as Professor Strum has suggested, we, as well as the Court,
tend to take its disguise seriously."' In any event, there is a certain
disquietude which overcomes at least this reviewer at the suggestion
that, beneath what frequently appears to be a reasonably honest
intellectual struggle by the Court to steer a course somewhere between
judicial impotence and judicial hegemony, there is simply a practical
calculation about the constellation of political power.
NANCY H. FINK*
40. Id.
41. STRUM 5.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Fellow in Law and Human-
ities, Harvard University, 1975-76.
1151BOOK REVIEW
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/10
